

ASSOCIATE PARLIAMENTARY GROUP ON SUDAN

Visit to Sudan 7th - 12th April 2002



**Facilitated by Christian Aid, Oxfam GB, Save the Children,
Tearfund, and the British Embassy, Khartoum**

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We visited Sudan between April 6th and 13th 2002 under the auspices of the Associate Parliamentary Group for Sudan accompanied by HM Ambassador to Sudan Richard Makepeace, Dan Silvey of Christian Aid and the Group co-ordinator Colin Robertson.

Our grateful thanks go to Colin and Dan for their superb organisation, tolerance and patience, to Christian Aid, Oxfam GB, Save the Children and Tearfund for their financial and logistical support, and to Ambassador Makepeace for his unfailing courtesy, deep knowledge of the current situation and crucial introductions.

Our visit to southern Sudan could not have gone ahead without the hospitality and support of Susan from Unicef in Rumbek and Julie from Tearfund at Maluakon. As well as being grateful to them and their organisations we are enormously impressed by their courage and commitment to helping people in such difficult and challenging circumstances.

Thanks to the efforts of these and many others we were able to pack a huge number of meetings and discussions into a few days, across several hundred miles of the largest country in Africa.

The primary purpose of our visit was to listen and learn. Everyone talked to us of peace, and of their ideas about the sort of political settlement needed to ensure that such a peace would be sustainable, with every part of the country developed for the benefit of all of its people.


We now know, despite the ghastly circumstances of a situation that should shame the whole world, that there is hope for the people of Sudan.

North and south we wish them well.

Hilton Dawson MP
(Labour, Lancaster and Wyre)




David Drew MP
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For four of the last five decades Sudan has been wracked by one of Africa's most brutal civil wars, involving a struggle between successive Governments in Khartoum and rebel groups such as the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA). The human cost of this conflict has been appalling. It has led to the loss of over 2 million Sudanese lives. There are over 4 million internally displaced people (IDPs) in Sudan, and 92% of the population live in poverty. There is a chronic lack of basic services such as healthcare, safe water and education. An often competing range of peace initiatives - most notably the IGAD process and the Joint Egyptian Libyan Initiative - have made little progress. Nevertheless, there is hope in the shape of a renewed commitment to ending Sudan's war amongst the international community. We consider that our colonial history coupled with the hopes and expectations of all sectors of Sudanese society gives the UK a unique role and special responsibility to the people of Sudan. **We urge the UK Government to maintain and develop its current focus on Sudan, and to work effectively with the US and key European and African governments to bring the conflict to an end through a co-ordinated and coherent peace process.**

The war in Sudan is rooted in the political, economic, social and religious divisions, which have led to the marginalisation of certain communities in Sudan, most notably those of the country's south. The Associate Parliamentary Group (APG) believes that only a just peace settlement, which addresses the roots of the conflict, can be sustainable. Such a settlement should guarantee the right of the south to self-determination through a referendum. It should also address issues relating to the marginalisation of minorities across the country, including the application of Sharia law to non-Muslims. Mechanisms must be put in place to guarantee a more equitable distribution of Sudan's resources, and to promote democratisation. **We believe that the IGAD Declaration of Principles, which places these issues on the agenda, remains the best basis for the negotiation of a political settlement.**

Decades of underdevelopment and the effects of war have made large numbers of Sudanese people, particularly in the south of the country, dependent on emergency relief aid. The vast majority of Sudanese have no ready access to education or health facilities. The APG visited education, health and food security projects and believes that such projects can feasibly be undertaken in areas of relative stability. **We recommend that a more long-term approach be taken by donors, by supporting projects that**

foster self-reliance and strengthen the coping mechanisms of vulnerable communities. In particular, the Department for International Development should support education in Sudan, which would contribute to peace and to the rebuilding of Sudanese communities and civil society.

Large areas of Sudan are periodically inaccessible to humanitarian agencies. As the APG set off for Sudan some 40 locations were denied flight access by the Government of Sudan, leaving hundreds of thousands of Sudan's most vulnerable people cut off from external assistance. **The UK, along with the US and European governments, need to work with both parties towards full negotiated access to all vulnerable areas in Sudan.**

The commencement of oil extraction in 1998 has shifted the dynamics of the war. The oilfields have become a key strategic area. The SPLA have attacked oil installations and the APG found very strong evidence and heard compelling first-hand accounts which indicated that Government troops and aircraft have been attacking and displacing civilians, as part of a strategy to depopulate the areas around the oilfields. Oil revenues are also linked with an increase in military expenditure, while there has been little or no improvement in services for the people. The role of oil in fuelling the conflict must be addressed as part of a broader international engagement in Sudan, and action must be taken at once to stop attacks on civilians around the oilfields. **We recommend that the UK support the deployment of human rights monitors in and around the oilfields. Oil companies should be required to disclose the payments they make to the Government of Sudan as part of a transparent auditing of oil revenues. This would help to ensure that oil revenues are spent in a way which is of benefit to Sudanese people.**

The situation of human rights in Sudan remains a cause for grave concern. Massive human rights abuses are committed in the context of the war, the problem of abductions and slavery persists, security forces operate with impunity, and political freedoms across the country are minimal. **We believe that while greater diplomatic engagement and more support for development in Sudan is vital, it is important that the normalisation of relations is linked to progress in terms of human rights and the peace process. Debt relief and EU-ACP aid should be used as incentives, and progress should be transparently monitored and measured against clear benchmarks.**

2. RATIONALE

The Associate Parliamentary Group for Sudan was formed in 1996 in response to concerns expressed by Sudanese Diaspora groups about the situation in their country and from the desire of Parliamentarians to try to achieve progress.

We now have a membership of over 70, drawn from both Houses of Parliament, and we are pleased that the Group is developing a very positive role to promote peace, human rights, justice and development for all the people of Sudan across Westminster and Whitehall.

In particular we are delighted that regular group meetings are very well attended and kept well informed by large numbers of Sudanese people living in the United Kingdom.

The Group was particularly concerned that its delegation to Sudan should consider four major issues:

- The peace process
- The need for humanitarian aid and development.
- The role of oil in the conflict.
- Human rights and good governance

This report presents our findings on each of these key issues.

3. BACKGROUND

3.1 THE CONFLICT

For four of the last five decades Sudan has been wracked by one of Africa's most brutal and long-running civil wars. This conflict is often characterised as a religious one between an Arab Muslim north and a black Christian south. Fundamentally however Sudan's war is rooted in a struggle for power and resources between successive governments in Khartoum and numerous historically marginalised groups. The largest armed group is the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) led by Dr John Garang, based predominantly in the African south of the country. There is also armed opposition in other areas, most notably the east of Sudan. The current phase of the conflict has lasted since 1983.

The human cost of this conflict has been phenomenal. It has led to the loss of over 2 million Sudanese lives through violence and starvation. There are now at least 4 million internally displaced Sudanese people, many of whom live a marginalised existence in camps outside Khartoum and other northern cities. This constitutes the largest displacement problem in the world. The war has also contributed to what aid agencies have termed a 'development disaster', which straddles both sides of the conflict. Underdevelopment is particularly pronounced in the south. Ninety-two percent of the whole population currently live below the poverty line. Southern Sudan is now the site of the UN's Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the world's largest relief operation.

The conflict is rooted in the marginalisation and underdevelopment of outlying regions of Sudan – most notably the south. The chief demand of the SPLA/M is for self-determination through a referendum, reflecting a broad desire across the south for autonomy from Khartoum. Another key issue is that of the separation of religion and state. Sudan's current system of Sharia law is seen as discriminatory by non-Muslim Sudanese, most of whom are southerners. A powerful new dynamic in the conflict has been created by Sudan's oil, which has been flowing since 1998. The oilfields have become a major strategic focus. Moreover, oil revenues have led to an increase in military spending, and a greater intransigence on the part of the government.

The picture has been further complicated by the proliferation of various armed factions such as the Sudan People's Defence Force (SPDF). The SPDF have allied themselves periodically with the Government of Sudan, but are currently allied with the SPLA following a pact in January 2002. Perhaps the bloodiest period in southern Sudan's recent history was during the SPLA split of the 1990s, when Nuer and Dinka tribes, under the SPDF and SPLA forces respectively, fought against each other. Many such intra-southern tribal conflicts exist in the south, over issues such as access to water and grazing rights. The proliferation of small arms in southern Sudan, and general insecurity, have exacerbated such conflicts. Tribal tensions have often been exploited by the Government of Sudan, who have supplied arms to various factions as part of a 'divide and rule' strategy.

The current Government of Sudan, led by General Omar el-Bashir seized power in a bloodless coup in 1989. It was isolated by sections of the international community during the 1990s due to its poor human rights record and associations with international terrorism. In 1995 the government was implicated in an assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. In 1998 the US bombed the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, believing it to be manufacturing chemical weapons. This was never proved. The government's relationship with the international community has undergone gradual improvements over the last year or so. UN Security Council sanctions on Sudan were removed in 2001.

3.2 Recent developments

The dynamics of the conflict have been altered since 1998 by the commencement of oil pumping in southern Sudan. Struggles for control over these oilfields have shifted the geographical focus of the war as the government of Sudan seek to protect oil installations from SPLA attacks. Furthermore, oil revenues have strengthened the resolve of the Government of Sudan to pursue a military solution to the conflict. A wide range of reports point to an upsurge in human rights abuses in Upper Nile, as Government militias and aircraft seek to clear civilians from the area surrounding the oilfields (see section 3.4, The Role of Oil in the Conflict).

The new revenues from oil that have strengthened the government's hand have been balanced by the alliance in January 2002 of two main southern armed groups, the SPLA and SPDF, leaving the southern forces in a stronger position militarily. Early 2002 has also seen an upsurge of dry-season fighting around the oilfields has had a worrying effect on civilians. Violence has displaced as many as 120,000 people and has created problems for aid agencies attempting to access vulnerable communities.

Conversely, and more hopefully, there seems to be a renewed commitment at the political level, both within the international community and amongst the key Sudanese players, to find peace in Sudan. Post September 11th, there is an increased focus on rebuilding 'failed states' which have been associated with terrorism. Coupled with falling oil prices and a generally acknowledged war fatigue amongst Sudanese leaders, this has created a 'window of opportunity' for peace in Sudan, according to many commentators. The US and UK have both appointed special envoys, and the US is currently in dialogue with the parties to the conflict to build co-operation around a set of four humanitarian issues: the need for investigation into the problem of abductions, a ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains region, zones of tranquillity for humanitarian purposes and the cessation of attacks on civilian targets (see section 3.2, Exploring the Peace Process for more detail).

3.3 The political and military players

3.3.1 The Government of Sudan

The current Government of Sudan, which seized power in 1989, does not currently represent any of what are historically northern Sudan's largest political parties - the Democratic Unionist Party and the Umma Party. It is built around a small constituency, based on a shifting alliance of high-ranking members of the military and Islamist politicians, augmented increasingly by oil interests.

Originally dominated by the Islamist politician Hassan al-Turabi, the key figures are currently President Omar al-Bashir and Vice President Ali Osman Taha. The government of Sudan remains one of the most authoritarian in Africa, with a human rights record that has attracted criticism from UN bodies and human rights NGOs amongst others. Since coming to power it has disbanded or co-opted a variety of opposition groups, institutions and trade unions, leaving little in the way of serious political opposition in Khartoum. Often characterised by detractors simply as an Islamic fundamentalist regime that ascribes to *Jihad*, in reality the Government is made up of a range of figures, from hardline Islamists to more moderate business-oriented politicians keen to improve Sudan's image internationally. Properly contested elections have not been held in Sudan since the current Government came to power.

3.3.2 Northern opposition parties


The two largest political parties in Sudan are the Umma Party and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). Neither of these parties contested the last elections held in Sudan in 2000 due to their perception that they would insufficiently democratic. For a number of years these two exiled opposition groups, along with the SPLA and other smaller groups such as the eastern-based Beja Congress, have been loosely allied under the banner of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). The Umma Party, led by Sadiq Al-Mahdi, has recently split this alliance by returning to Khartoum from exile. The DUP, led by Muhammad Osman Mirghani may soon do likewise following a slight improvement in the political atmosphere in Khartoum. Throughout its history, the NDA's effectiveness has been undermined by internal divisions between its diverse members, many of whom are under increasingly financial pressure due to their exile from Khartoum.

Another important party is the Popular National Congress, led by the Islamist Hassan al-Turabi. Turabi was the key figure behind the coalition that seized power in 1989. However, as speaker of the National Assembly his attempts to shift power from military to civilian institutions made some of his colleagues within

the Government uneasy. After signing an agreement with the SPLA, Turabi was placed under house arrest in February 2001, where he remains.

3.3.3 Southern groups

The main southern Sudanese military and political group is the SPLA/M, led by Dr John Garang, which has been fighting for autonomy from the Khartoum government since 1983. At its inception it was backed by the Ethiopian Mengistu regime, and has also enjoyed support from Uganda, Eritrea and the US at various stages in its history. During the 1990s it reinvented itself as a movement for a 'united, democratic and secular Sudan', reflecting its increasing desire to cultivate alliances in the north of the country, with groups such as the Sudan Alliance Forces (SAF) which has opened up a second front against the government in the east of Sudan. Other key areas affected by fighting are hard to classify as either north or south, underlining the fact that this is not a straightforward religious war. The Nuba Mountains region for example, which has been the



scene of some of the worst fighting and humanitarian problems, and whose population has been regularly attacked by government forces, is a predominantly Muslim area, despite playing host to a strong SPLA presence.

The SPLM has developed a civil administration to govern the south and have made some moves towards allowing a voice to civil society groups. It has also developed a humanitarian wing known as the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (SRRA), which is intended to channel emergency relief aid in SPLA controlled areas. Riek Machar's SDFP faction have recently broken off their alliance with Khartoum and realigned themselves with the SPLA, bringing to an end one of the major tribal-based splits within the south which led to so much bloodshed in the 1990s. Other factions, such as Lam Akol's SPLA-United group remain allied with the Government. Fighting continues between the SPLA and Government of Sudan, particularly around the oilfields in Western Upper Nile, which Garang has declared to be a military target.

3.3.4 Sudan's neighbours

Many of the states in the region have strong strategic interests in Sudan, and these have often contributed to the continuation of the conflict and have restricted the capability of Sudan's neighbours to help forge a successful peace settlement in Sudan..

- Egypt for example is heavily dependent on the Nile and seeks to maintain control over these through its relations with Sudan. Egypt views the potential separation of southern Sudan as a threat to this, and has therefore attempted to undermine any peace initiative based on self-determination for the south.
- Ethiopia's relationship with Sudan has been complex. Until 1991 a supporter of the SPLA, due largely to Cold War reasons, Ethiopia now seeks to a friendly relation with the Government of Sudan. Ethiopian rebels groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front have based themselves in eastern Sudan, and Ethiopian security forces have been

forced to cross the border in order to combat them. It is also dependent on Sudan for use of its ports and for oil.

- Uganda has generally had very poor relations with the Government of Sudan. Until recently a situation existed whereby Uganda supported the SPLA, whilst the Government of Sudan provided support for the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandan rebel group. Currently relations may be improving however, with the Ugandan and Sudanese governments co-operating to combat the activities of the LRA who operate across the border with southern Sudan.
- Eritrea is a supported the Sudan's NDA opposition grouping, and many exiled northern Sudanese politicians have been based in Asmara. They fear that the Khartoum government might destabilise Eritrea through support for Islamic opposition groups.

4. ISSUES OF CONCERN

4.1 EXPLORING THE PEACE PROCESS

Existing peace initiatives

Sudan's war has prompted what has been referred to as a 'traffic jam of peace initiatives'. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development or **IGAD peace initiative**, launched in 1993, has been the foremost vehicle for negotiation between the parties to the conflict over the last decade. IGAD is driven by Sudan's neighbours; chaired by the Kenyan government and involving Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Uganda. The political agreement at the heart of IGAD is the Declaration of Principles (DOP)², signed by the SPLA and Government of Sudan in 1994, which addresses some of the root causes of the conflict.

The Declaration of Principles include:

That 'the right of **self-determination** of the people of south Sudan to determine their future status through a referendum must be affirmed'

- That 'a **secular and democratic state** must be established in the Sudan...State and religion shall be separated'
- That 'appropriate and fair **sharing of wealth** among the various people of the Sudan must be realised'

Since 1994 IGAD has made little progress. This is due to a number of factors:

- Bad faith and lack of commitment on the part of the Government of Sudan and the SPLA. The Government seems particularly reluctant to engage effectively with IGAD, having improved its political and military leverage significantly since it signed the DOP.
- Institutional weaknesses on the part of the IGAD Secretariat, which needs greater material and political support from outside parties. The IGAD Partners Forum, representing European governments provides financing and technical support to IGAD, but to date has offered little in the way of political leverage.
- IGAD's failure to represent important regional players, most notably Egypt which has major strategic interests in Sudan, linked principally with the Nile waters.
- Important opposition parties within Sudan are not represented within IGAD, most notably the National Democratic Alliance.
- Other IGAD nations also have key strategic interests in Sudan. Uganda has security issues along its border with Sudan relating to the activities of the Lords Resistance Army guerrilla force. Other nations have difficulty in co-operating with each other. The relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea is particularly tense for example. That these nations are engaged as stakeholders is vital, but such dynamics can easily undermine the IGAD process and make for a lack of honest brokers.

There are numerous **other peace initiatives**, some of which have undoubtedly served as a distraction from IGAD.

- The **Joint-Libyan Egyptian Initiative (JLEI)** was proposed in 1999. JLEI reflects the desire of Egypt in particular to maintain the unity of Sudan, due to its interest in maintaining political control over the Nile Basin. Self-determination and the separation of religion and state are not included in the JLEI, and as such the SPLA have not been engaged with it. The initiative is largely an attempt to reconcile northern opposition parties from the NDA with the Government of Sudan, isolating the SPLA.
- The US envoy John **Danforth** has recently proposed four confidence-building measures, which the SPLA and Government of Sudan have agreed (see separate box).
- The **EU-Sudan dialogue** is the centrepiece of the EU's 'critical dialogue' with the Government of Sudan. It is aimed at normalising relations with Khartoum following progress in five areas: human rights, terrorism, the peace process, democratisation and Sudan's relations with neighbouring states.
- Other initiatives include the attempts of the Nigerian government to increase dialogue between the various southern parties. Nigerian President Olesegun Obasanjo is committed to organising a southern conference in order to reconcile divisions within the south.

Sudan's war is perhaps Africa's most devastating and complex conflict, the human cost of which is appalling. Over two millions lives have been lost and over four million Sudanese people displaced. Most northern Sudanese have had a family member killed or injured in the war, whilst communities across much of the south of the country have been decimated.

The potential of Sudan is evident however. Aside from the country's mineral wealth, its agricultural fertility, and its strategic positioning along the Nile, there is an evident human potential. This can be seen in the valiant attempts of ordinary Sudanese to improve local education and healthcare facilities, to improve the capacity of civil society, to institute systems of justice, and to establish remarkable sporting events such as the Twic Olympics³ all in the face of massive obstacles.

The APG heard from a wide variety of individuals and organisations, both from the north and south; in Khartoum, in the homes and premises of opposition politicians, the church meeting room, the National Assembly and around the Ambassador's dinner table.

Vice President Taha, senior officials, representatives of NGOs both north and south, the Chief Justice in Rumbek, SPLA fighters in Maluakon and Keew, the

SPLM in southern Sudan and Nairobi – all told us of their desire for peace. However, the complexity of the situation and the lack of trust between the parties is equally manifest. It is clear that a comprehensive political and diplomatic effort on the part of the international community is required if progress is to be achieved.

Though existing peace processes in Sudan have made little headway, the APG's visit however, coincided with a time of increased optimism. Key players inside and outside Sudan feel there is currently a 'window of opportunity' for the negotiation of a peace settlement. In the aftermath of September 11th the international community are more interested in bringing stability to 'failed states'. The Sudanese government has shown a desire to engage with these efforts, perhaps partly to ensure that they are not internationally excluded. Recent months have seen an upsurge in diplomatic engagement in Sudan on the part of the international community. Both the UK and US have appointed special envoys to Sudan, and there seems to be a renewed optimism about the possibility of ending the war. Throughout Sudan, on all sides of the conflict we were told that people welcome the involvement of the UK in helping to resolve the country's problems. Our colonial history and the expectations of all sections of the Sudanese community gives us a special responsibility to Sudan.

The APG welcomes the UK government's increased commitment to promoting peace in Sudan.

We hope that the UK's special envoy, backed by the FCO's new Sudan Unit will work effectively towards a co-ordinated and coherent peace process. The UK, in partnership with the US and European governments and key regional players, must press the parties towards a negotiated political settlement.

4.1.1 A just and lasting peace settlement

The majority of Sudanese people the APG met during the visit had enjoyed no more than a decade of peace during their lifetimes. Sudan's long war has left a legacy of mistrust and resentment amongst many Sudanese people, particularly in the south of the country. Conversations with a range of Sudanese people demonstrated to us that while there was a strong demand for peace, Sudanese people would not accept peace at any cost. Fundamentally, there was a desire for a just and lasting peace settlement, addressing the root

causes of the conflict and providing for a more open and participatory form of government.

Inevitably, we found a polarisation of views between the north and south of the country on the content of a peace settlement. Vice-President Taha told us that the Government of Sudan remain committed to the unity of the country, and would be very resistant to the separation of the south. While they have accepted the right of the south to self-determination, and are prepared to discuss devolution of power, there is a tangible reluctance to discuss the possibility of a

referendum on the separation of the south. The SPLA/M leadership themselves, whom the APG met in Nairobi, say they are fighting for a 'united, democratic and secular Sudan'. Openly calling for independence for the south would make it harder for them to form important alliances with neighbouring states and other opposition groups within Sudan. Nevertheless the SPLA places an increasing emphasis on the right of self-determination for southern Sudan, reflecting a growing popular demand for it.

It seems that a vision of a united Sudan is not representative of the wishes of many southerners. Many whom the APG spoke to showed a strong desire for independence from the north, seemingly out of desperation, out of a feeling that their oppression has been so great that they have little chance of equality as part of a larger Sudan. Similar sentiments prevail within the rank and file of the SPLA.

It seems therefore that the key issue to be confronted in the Sudanese peace process is undoubtedly that of


self-determination for southern Sudan, in the form of a democratic referendum, which would take place after an interim period agreed upon by the parties to the conflict. **The APG believes that self-determination through a referendum must be an integral part of any settlement.**

Many international diplomats and analysts, including US envoy John Danforth see independence for the south as unfeasible, viewing a confederal structure as more realistic, both politically and economically⁴. Certainly, an independent south would face immense difficulties given its economic underdevelopment and lack of infrastructure and administrative capacity. It may well be that the people of southern Sudan could be persuaded to live within a confederal system by a significant transfer of power and a real sharing of resources. Nevertheless, the APG believes that self-determination in the form of a referendum must be kept on the agenda for two reasons.

Firstly, southern Sudanese people are extremely

The APG believes that any peace settlement must be just and sustainable, and must therefore address the root causes of the conflict.

The Sudanese people have the right to self-determination, and the UK and others must not preclude any options regarding the future of the country. The APG believes that the IGAD Declaration of Principles remains the best basis for the negotiation of a political settlement.



suspicious of attempts to water down the commitment to self-determination in the Declaration of Principles. SPLA fighters whom the APG met stated that they would die rather than give up fighting for the right of southern self-determination. The New Sudan Council of Churches, perhaps the most influential southern-based civil society grouping, expressed such wishes with similar conviction. Affirming the right of self-determination is therefore essential in order to persuade the south to buy into the peace process in a committed way.

Secondly, a guarantee of the right of self-determination for the south seems a vital safeguard, ensuring that an interim arrangement is fair, equitable and that it is adhered to. Any settlement would certainly have to address fundamental issues linked with the conflict, delivering development and political rights to

marginalised communities. The only adequate safeguard would be the guarantee of self-determination with all options, in the form of a democratic referendum, after an interim period agreed upon by both parties to the conflict.

Whether the future of Sudan lies in a form of unity or in outright separation, any new arrangement will only be legitimised through a referendum. It is therefore in the interests of both sides that this issue be faced fairly and democratically. Such a referendum would have to be monitored by the international community, and its outcomes guaranteed. A referendum would also have to be preceded by civic education, the fostering of civil society and the enhancement of democratic structures, as well as a broad and free political debate about the future of the country.

The issue of sharia law and its application to non-Muslim southerners has received much attention. The exemption of the south from sharia, at least, would appear to be an undeniable element of a settlement. However, millions of non-Muslim IDPs live in the north of the country. There have been reports of amputations and stoning both of northerners and of southerners in government controlled areas⁵. Perhaps as importantly, the use of Islam as a constitutional basis means that it is hard for non-Muslims to be treated equally in society more broadly. The IGAD Declaration of Principles states that 'a secular and democratic state must be established in the Sudan'. Representatives of the Government of Sudan were willing to discuss this issue. It was clear to the APG that the government of Sudan would be resistant to the outright separation of state and religion, but were prepared to consider a constitution that would place a greater emphasis on 'citizenship' than on religion. Within the context of a federal Sudan the government would also devolve law-making powers to individual states. These issues can only be worked out by Sudanese people themselves, but must be high on the agenda of any peace discussions.

Suitable mechanisms must also be agreed upon which guarantee an equitable share of national resources to the underdeveloped south, particularly with regards to the contested oil reserves of Western Upper Nile. The

south is in desperate need of economic and social development, and can only achieve this if it receives substantial economic resources.

4.1.2 The role of the international community

Virtually everyone that the APG met said that Sudan needs help from outside to bring about a just and sustainable peace; from IGAD partners and other African countries, from Egypt and Libya, from the US, Norway and the EU. All considered that the UK has an important role because of our historical and colonial links with Sudan. Both northerners and southerners talked of a 'special relationship' between the two countries, and many felt that Britain had a particular duty because of our role in creating the Sudanese state. This expectation has risen since the visit of the Secretary of State for International Development, the Rt. Hon Clare Short MP in January 2002, and the appointment of Alan Goulty as the UK's Special Envoy. The APG were particularly warmly welcomed across Sudan, sometimes by people who had endured considerable inconvenience to meet us.

The increasingly proactive engagement of the US, notably through the work of Special Envoy John Danforth (see box), has so far been targeted at building confidence and co-operation between the two parties on key humanitarian issues, such as the ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains. The increasingly active involvement of the US and others is likely to, and should, focus increasingly on the key political issues that stand in the way of peace.

While any peace agreement must be made in Sudan with the help of its African neighbours, the role of the US, UK and others in supporting this process is vital, and must be targeted at addressing flaws in the existing peace initiatives. One such flaw is the weakness of the IGAD secretariat and IGAD Partners Forum, which are lacking in terms of resources and political leverage. Egypt and Libya must be engaged in the peace process. Both are important regional players with major strategic interests in Sudan, linked principally with control over the Nile. They must be brought into a unified and coherent peace

US Involvement: the Danforth Initiative

US involvement in Sudan has accelerated since September 11th, with a determination to rehabilitate Sudan and ensure that its terrorist links are a thing of the past. Senator John Danforth was appointed as Special Envoy to the Sudan in October 2001. His first move has been to set four 'tests' or 'confidence building measures'⁶. These do not form the basis of a political settlement to the conflict but are designed to assess the parties' seriousness about peace, whilst achieving progress on high profile humanitarian issues. These tests were;

- Allowing humanitarian access to SPLA-held areas of the **Nuba Mountains** and the establishment of a ceasefire in the region.
- Respecting a **ceasefire for vaccination programmes** to proceed.
- A cessation of **aerial bombardment** against civilian targets (later modified to include cessation of all attacks against civilians).
- Action to curb **enslavement**, in the form of a commission to investigate cases and release people held in captivity.

Danforth has since reported back from his mission, recommending that the US continue to engage in Sudan in an 'energetic and effective' manner, '(enhancing their) presently light engagement in Sudan in order to be effective participants in a sustained, intensive peace process'⁷. The US policy is not to unilaterally implement a new peace agreement, but to work with regional players in order to renew existing peace proposals, possibly through a merger of IGAD and the Joint Libyan-Egyptian Initiative.

Senator Danforth's report to President Bush appears to rule out independence for the south. As a consequence, the reaction of the SPLA and other southern parties to the report has been fairly negative. There are also doubts about the effectiveness of the confidence building measures, particularly the undertaking not to attack civilians, due to the lack of monitoring mechanisms. Most importantly however, Danforth's report affirms the continuing involvement of the US, and Danforth has since been reappointed by President Bush. Continuing high-level engagement on the part of the US is vital, and must now work towards a political settlement of the conflict.



process in which they can play a constructive role. Above all it is important that all the key players are brought together in pursuit of a unified and coherent peace process. Countries such as the US and UK can play a vital role as honest brokers, but their diplomacy must be backed up by political pressure. The UK and EU have a policy of offering debt relief and EU-ACP aid as an incentive for the government of Sudan to make progress towards a peace settlement. However, the manner in which such progress should be measured is unclear.

There is currently little place for civil society

The APG recommends that UK and EU diplomatic engagement with Sudan be backed up by a firm of transparent system of incentives and disincentives.

Debt relief and EU-ACP development aid for the government of Sudan must be based upon tangible process in the peace process and human rights. Such progress must be monitored and measured by a defined and transparent set of benchmarks.

engagement in the Sudanese peace process. A range of civil society representatives and ordinary Sudanese people whom the APG met showed a desire for their voices to be heard in the debate about the future of their country. As one Sudanese NGO worker told us in Nairobi:

'It is crucial that civil society becomes a partner in the peace process so that peace is rooted in the community. This is the only way to ensure that issues of democracy and equitable development are not forgotten by our leaders, and to ensure a sustainable peace'⁸.

It is important that they are given this right, most notably in the shape of self-determination. But there is also a need for assistance from the international community so that Sudanese people might build a strong civil society, enjoy freedom of expression, create democratic structures and to help people engage in understanding concepts of citizenship. The APG believes that these are vital elements of an inclusive, just and sustainable peace process. Grassroots peace processes, which address localised conflicts, are an important part of this (see box).

The APG believes donors should give increased support to grassroots peace initiatives and facilitating civil society involvement in the peace process.

Local processes such as the People-to-People talks, which address inter-tribal and localised conflicts must be encouraged across the country including initiatives which cross the north-south divide. These could be funded through DFID's Conflict Resolution Pool. Programmes which increase the capacity of civil society should also be encouraged, and a role for civil society in the peace process developed.

Grassroots peace processes

The central conflict in Sudan between the government and SPLA, has often fed upon and sustained historical inter-tribal rivalries and divisions. Such divisions have been exploited by the main warring parties, and particularly by the Government of Sudan who often arm tribal militias as part of their overall strategy.

Great achievements have nevertheless been made by community based grassroots peace-building processes, such as the Nuer-Dinka People-to-People process. The Nuer-Dinka conflict was based on disagreements over grazing land and cattle theft. Such divisions were partly responsible for the SPLA split of the early 1990s - one of the bloodiest periods in southern Sudan's history.

Successive peace conferences, supported by the New Sudan Council of Churches and Christian Aid, CAFOD and Tearfund succeeded in achieving a Covenant that pledged the ending of all hostilities, and facilitated co-operation on the return of abductees and the sharing of grazing land. It was achieved with the involvement of a range of tribal chiefs, church leaders, women's organisations and other grassroots groups. The subsequent easing of Nuer-Dinka tribal tensions, was one contributing factor in the ending of hostilities between the Riek Machar's Nuer SPDF factions and the predominantly Dinka SPLA.

Other promising grassroots processes include the Baggara-Dinka conference at Wunjok in 2000. Baggara tribesmen have traditionally been responsible for large numbers of abductions. Some progress has been made towards eliminating this practice, and the inter-tribal peace provides a more promising environment for the return of abductees.⁹

4.2 HUMANITARIAN AID AND DEVELOPMENT

Sudan contains many of Africa's most underdeveloped regions. Southern Sudan in particular, along with areas such as the Nuba Mountains, have been marginalised throughout Sudan's history. The British colonial administration placed little emphasis on building up infrastructure and education in the south, placing an emphasis instead on localised tribal government. Little changed when Sudan was granted independence in 1956. The centralisation of power in Khartoum, and Sudan's religious and ethnic divisions, meant that many areas, north and south, continued to be underdeveloped. The civil war, which started in 1955 inevitably deepened these problems, which have persisted up to the present day. During the APG's visit the lack of development across southern Sudan was particularly startling, even in areas which are not touched directly by the conflict.

Throughout the trip the APG was struck by difficulties faced by Sudanese people coping with the effects of war. The UN's Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) is the largest aid operation in the world, supporting the population of southern Sudan at a cost of around \$180 million per annum. Yet there is a clear need to place greater emphasis on projects which enable Sudanese communities in the longer term, in areas such as education, health and food security.

Like many donors, the UK Department for International Development has traditionally preferred to target resources on basic emergency humanitarian aid, in the belief that greater 'value-added' areas such as education and the development of a health infrastructure cannot be addressed whilst conflict persists. There would seem to be a shift in this opinion however, as indicated by recent comments by the Secretary of State for International Development¹⁰. Certainly, the impression gained by the APG was that well-targeted education and health projects could feasibly be undertaken, at least in areas of relative stability. The need for such projects is unquestionably apparent on the ground, with much of the population having minimal access to basic education and health services. There is a tangible human potential in Sudan – donors could do more to help train teachers and medical assistants.

At the same time, there is an equally urgent need for a concerted political effort to see that basic humanitarian aid can be delivered in and around conflict areas, such as Western Upper Nile. Aid flights are routinely denied by the Government of Sudan, making the provision of basic humanitarian assistance all but impossible and leaving hundreds of thousands of vulnerable people without humanitarian support. The issue of humanitarian access has been incorporated into the recent agreements forged by the US envoy John Danforth, but flight denials continue to disrupt OLS efforts. Whilst the APG was in Sudan blanket bans were in place on humanitarian flights across much of the south.

4.2.1 Education

Education is a key issue everywhere in Sudan, and one which is crucial in terms of the country's ability to rebuild itself. The APG also believes more education could only be of benefit to the peace process. Enrolment rates are approximately 25% across the country, but in marginalised and conflict affected areas the situation is considerably worse. An estimated 15% of the population of southern Sudan is literate¹¹. The vast majority of southern Sudanese have received no education since independence, resulting in what many refer to as a 'lost generation'. In southern Sudan, an area comparable in size to western Europe there are only 20 secondary schools.



Coupled with a lack of education, schools in the north and south face immense challenges regarding the quality of education they are able to provide, due to lack of resources and basic equipment such as books. These problems are particularly worrying in southern Sudan where, should peace be brokered over the next year or

so, there will be a genuine deficit of educated people able to administer the south.

There is a particular lack of educated women in Sudan. Despite the impressive statistic that 50% of students at Khartoum University are women, the picture seems to be different in marginalised areas, particularly in the south. At the teacher training centre the APG visited in Akon in Bahr El Ghazal there was only one female trainee teacher, reflecting the lack of literate women in the south and the position of women within southern Sudanese society. Less than 10% of teachers in southern Sudan are women, while in Bahr el Ghazal only 8% of Grade 5 pupils are girls¹². Particularly in marginalised areas a lack of educational opportunities for females compounds their social exclusion, and makes it harder for them to cope with the family breakdowns which are so common in the context of the conflict.

There are some very basic primary education facilities in the south, in areas not directly affected by conflict. A primary obstacle is a lack of teachers, which is an outcome of the recruitment of many adults into the

SPLA, of the historical deficit of educated southerners and of the difficulty in providing incentives for teachers. Further problems across the south are posed by cultural, linguistic and religious factors. Education in government-controlled areas of the south has been in Arabic, resulting in a lack of English teachers in many areas. The majority of southerners are resistant to a linguistically and culturally 'Arabised' curriculum. It is important that curricula, including choice of language, are tailored to local needs.

The provision of assistance to the education system via either the Government of Sudan or the SRRA is highly politically sensitive, due to fears about the politicisation of the curriculum. However there would seem to be a role for donors in providing basic education and educational capacity building as part of the humanitarian effort, providing adequate safeguards were in place. This is a view echoed by NGOs. Unicef, for example believes that 'basic education must play a part in every emergency programme'¹³. The teacher training must be stepped up as soon as possible in order to provide the next generation of educators for Sudan's poorest areas.

Access to higher education

The APG heard a great deal about the dire lack of access to higher education, particularly for southerners. Southern-based universities, such as Juba University, have been moved to Khartoum by the government. Southern students studying in the north face a number of obstacles including an Islamised curriculum, the requirement for high school students to undertake national service (often involving fighting in the 'Jihad' against the SPLA), and general discrimination. Obtaining British Council scholarships is problematic for southerners in particular, due to lack of access to the British Council office based in Khartoum. There are some limited opportunities via Cheveney Scholarships and around twenty places through the Association of Commonwealth Universities, which are administered in Nairobi and Kampala. However, such provision is clearly inadequate for the purposes of training professionals capable of rebuilding southern Sudan's civil administration.

The APG recommends that the Department for International Development support education in Sudan.

Education can make a contribution to peace and to the rebuilding of Sudanese communities and civil society. Particular support is needed for carefully targeted education projects in Sudan, delivered via the UN and NGOs. Opportunities for higher education for southern Sudanese and other marginalised groups must be expanded.

4.2.2 Healthcare

Sudan has some of the worst health indicators in the world. Life expectancy at birth is 56 years. The maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births) is 550. 10% of children die before the age of five¹⁴. Clearly there are severe problems across the country, though the APG focussed primarily on problems and provision in the south of the country, where the worst humanitarian situation exists.

Northern Sudan

The APG did not directly investigate healthcare in the north, but meetings with a wide range of individuals gave us an insight into many of the problems faced. There are doctors and healthcare facilities available in the north but these tend to be readily available only to the rich, many of whom also go abroad for advanced medical and surgical treatment. Some vaccination programmes are undertaken, though coverage is far from comprehensive. Public health services are poor, and widely considered to be deteriorating due to lack of government funding, particularly in marginalised areas outside the Nile Basin. Access to government health services is extremely problematic for IDPs living in the north.

The APG was informed that female genital mutilation (FGM) is undertaken by 90-100% of population in northern Sudan, a practice with severe health ramifications, particularly related to childbirth. Worryingly, FGM is spreading to non-Islamic southern families living in squatter settlements around Khartoum, who practice it in line with the norms of northern Sudanese society. Sudanese NGOs working on these issues face difficulties in confronting what is something of a social taboo, and feel that little progress is being made on the issue.

HIV/AIDS is largely undocumented as a problem in Sudan, but many feel that it is becoming a serious problem. The virus is spread in large part by the country's large number of soldiers. It is clear that an adequate testing mechanism for HIV is lacking, but many

clinics report rising levels of Tuberculosis, a disease often related to AIDS. The Government of Sudan has announced a National AIDS Control Programme but it is clear that a more robust response is needed across the board.

There was evidence, in our meeting with Dr Abdulhalim Almutaafi, the Wali (or Mayor) of Khartoum, that progress was being made in terms of basic public health and water supply in the Khartoum area. In poorer, more marginalised areas there is still problems with access to such services. 40% of northern Sudanese have no access to safe drinking water¹⁵.

Southern Sudan

Even in comparison to the situation in the north of the country, in southern Sudan health problems are severe. The war, which moves from area to area and often disrupts aid provision, has led to high levels of malnutrition and consequently resistance to preventable diseases - such as measles, malaria, diarrhoea and respiratory infection - is very low. Attendant health problems such as amenorrhoea (lack of menstruation) are common. Clearly, health problems are closely linked with broader issues of food security and nutrition. Sudan has the worst statistics in the world for parasitic illnesses such as Guinea Worm and kala azar. Despite public education programmes by NGOs on these illnesses, and on other conditions such as trachoma, they remain a serious problem.

Health services in southern Sudan are rudimentary. There are some scattered vaccination programmes run by NGOs. Doctors are scarce and medical centres are run by medical attendants and traditional birthing assistants. A few basic drugs, such as antibiotics are available from agencies such as *Pharmacie Sans Frontieres*. The main medical problems are diarrhoea and malaria, with tuberculosis clearly on the increase. Use of simple treatments are often lacking. For example, oral rehydration therapy, which controls diarrhoea in children, is used on under 20% of under-5s¹⁶.

Whilst the situation is problematic throughout southern Sudan, the APG were shocked by the severity of the problems faced in Keew, Western Upper Nile where there are many people who have been displaced by fighting around the oilfields. Agencies and Sudanese staff are attempting to cope with severe health problems, but are clearly in need of greater outside assistance. Problems across Western Upper Nile, a focus of the conflict in recent years, are aggravated by the challenges which humanitarian agencies face in operating in a war touched area, challenges which force them to periodically suspend operations. MSF for example, report that for this reason over 100,000 people have died in Western Upper Nile as a result of kala azar, a treatable disease, in recent years¹⁷.

FGM is not widely practised in southern Sudan, and NGOs are training traditional birthing assistants. However there is little capacity to deal with complications in childbirth. In general, severe surgical cases cannot be dealt with in southern Sudan and have to be flown to Lokichoggio in northern Kenya, though there is only the capacity to deal with a small minority in this way. This contributes to high maternal mortality rates of around 865 per 100,000 live births in the south¹⁸. Intermediary medical and surgical cases, such as the child with a cleft palate whom the APG met in Akon, are left untreated, despite the medical and social problems attached to such a condition in southern Sudan. HIV and AIDS is inevitably increasing as a

problem, with many men in the military and families often broken up. Again, there is little research on this but some clinics report infection rates of over 50%. Rising rates of tuberculosis also indicate that HIV infection is on the increase. The APG were greatly impressed by the work of MSF, Unicef and Save the Children, but these agencies are clearly stretched by the scale of problems they face.

4.2.3 Civil society

Throughout the visit we met a range of Sudanese civil society groups who were working hard to improve the situation of Sudanese people, and to promote more accountable systems of governance. On both sides of the conflict we met groups who were monitoring and reporting human rights abuses, engaging in public education and facilitating dialogue between different groups. These groups are working in difficult circumstances and need encouragement if they are to succeed in the building of a more accountable and democratic future in Sudan. Donors should look closely at providing funding, training and other forms of support to selected civil society groups in Sudan. Pressure needs to be exerted on both the Government of Sudan and the SPLA where necessary, in order to ensure that such groups are able to operate more freely.

The APG recommends that the Department for International Development support education in Sudan.

Education can make a contribution to peace and to the rebuilding of Sudanese communities and civil society. Particular support is needed for carefully targeted education projects in Sudan, delivered via the UN and NGOs. Opportunities for higher education for southern Sudanese and other marginalised groups must be expanded.

4.2.4 Humanitarian challenges

Whilst the APG felt that the situation in southern Sudan necessitates a greater focus on longer-term education, health and food security projects, this should not detract from the importance of making sure that the entire population of the war-affected areas have access to basic humanitarian aid. Large areas of Sudan have been periodically inaccessible for OLS aid agencies – usually those areas which are most affected by the conflict. The Government of Sudan routinely issues flight denials to

aid agencies in advance of military activity. In March 2002 for example, forty-five locations in southern Sudan were denied flight permits, leaving an estimated 345,000 vulnerable people without access to food aid¹⁹. One food security warning issued by aid agencies in May 2002 estimates that an area the size of France is now out of bounds to aid agencies²⁰. Areas outside OLS boundaries are prone to similar problems – Southern Blue Nile for example has been inaccessible for almost three years. After years of access problems the Nuba Mountains now has a ceasefire in place, though both food aid and ceasefire monitors have been slow in

coming in. It is to be hoped that further such ceasefires can be negotiated and implemented in areas where the humanitarian need is greatest.

In addition, humanitarian operations are often disrupted directly by military activities, such as the attack on a food-drop at Bieh in February 2002 which killed 24

civilians, including an MSF member of staff²¹. MSF report continued destruction and looting of health facilities by all parties to the conflict²². Whilst US Envoy John Danforth's 'confidence-building measures' address some such humanitarian problems, there is clearly a need for stronger action at a political level to pressure both parties to the conflict to guarantee civilians access to humanitarian aid in accordance with international law.

The APG recommends that the UK and others make a concerted effort to ensure that humanitarian agencies are allowed to operate effectively by both sides in the conflict.

The UK government and others must be more co-ordinated and robust in pushing for negotiated flight access to problem areas, in pressing both parties to respect international humanitarian law, and in backing this up with an effective system of monitoring.

4.3 THE ROLE OF OIL IN THE CONFLICT

Sudan's wealth of oil reserves are vital to its future²³. They have the potential to provide resources and fund basic services for the Sudanese people, and also to energise the economy, increasing technology transfer and upskilling of the population. Currently however, Sudan's oil is clearly fuelling the war, providing a focus for fighting, exacerbating displacement of the population and bringing despair where hope might have existed. This is why the role of oil in determining Sudan's future cannot be underestimated and any prognosis of the path to peace and development in Sudan must centre on this issue.

4.3.1 Fighting around the oilfields

The oilfields in Western Upper Nile, southern Sudan

have become a focus for fighting between the Government of Sudan and SPLA forces. The SPLA have repeatedly declared the oil facilities to be a military target²⁴. Meanwhile Government troops are reportedly attacking civilians and displacing them from areas around the oilfields.

The APG visited Keew in Western Upper Nile, an area where there are displaced people from villages around the oilfields, and heard accounts of government attacks on civilians. Everyone we spoke to amongst the displaced people could testify to witnessing casualties and to the impact of being forced from their homes. We had no reason to believe that these accounts were anything but genuine, such was the clarity of the stories we were told. Several described government militias visiting their villages and ordering to them to move. Later, we were told, these troops returned

Human rights abuses around the oilfields

There are numerous accounts by NGOs, journalists, the UN Human Rights Rapporteur for Sudan²⁵, the Canadian Government Assessment Mission²⁶ and others, which document human rights abuses taking place around the oilfields.

The majority of these abuses have taken place in Western Upper Nile, although other areas in Eastern Upper Nile and Southern Blue Nile have also been affected. The attacks reportedly involve the violent displacement of civilians from areas around the oilfields, which have become the major geographical focus of the conflict. In its initial stages, many of these attacks were undertaken by pro-Government southern militia groups such as Riek Machar's SPDF faction, in addition to government troops. However, since the SPDF-SPLA merger of January 2002 such attacks are undertaken chiefly by government militias, supported by aerial bombardment by government helicopter gunships and Antonov bombers. It is believed that this is part of a deliberate strategy to depopulate the oil areas, in order to facilitate oil pumping and exploration without the threat of SPLA attack.

There are numerous reports of killings, torture, abductions and rape of civilians in Western Upper Nile. Villages have been subject to aerial bombardment and troops have burnt huts and other buildings²⁷. These allegations have been backed up by interviews with IDPs from the oil areas conducted by the UN Special Rapporteur for human rights in Sudan, Gerhart Baum, who reports:

'The Special Rapporteur continued to receive information whereby oil exploitation is continuing to cause widespread displacement...Most of (the IDPs) reported interfactional fighting featuring extensive looting of cattle and burning down of villages. Reports also pointed to bombings by Antonov planes, often followed by attacks by helicopter gunships aimed at clearing the land around the oilfields'²⁸

Reports by the European Coalition on Oil in Sudan (ECOS) estimate that 130,000 people from Western Upper Nile and Ruweng County were on the move in May 2002, fleeing from oil related violence²⁹. Humanitarian agencies face huge problems in operating in these areas, due to flight bans and insecurity, exacerbating the effects on the local population. Due to heavy fighting and the severe disruption of aid provision, many aid workers fear that there is a very real danger of severe food shortages³⁰.

The APG recommends that strong steps be taken immediately to stop attacks on civilians around the oilfields. Human rights abuses around the oilfields must stop now. The UK should lend political and financial support to a team of international human rights monitors in all areas where oil-related human rights abuses are reportedly occurring.



accompanied by helicopter gunships, which fired upon villagers. Members of the APG were shocked by these accounts and by conditions in this area, which bore comparison to those in Bahr el-Ghazal in 1998. There was evidence of serious malnutrition and basic health services struggling to cope, due to the influx of large numbers of displaced people from the oilfields. Health and food security problems in the war-affected areas are exacerbated by the denial of access for aid flights by the Government. These bans also mean that human rights abuses in the oilfields go largely unreported.

4.3.2 Oil revenues

A second key area of concern is the way in which oil revenues are spent by the government of Sudan. The APG spoke to a range of civil society representatives in the north and south, all of whom expressed resentment that they did not know where oil revenues were going. The south has derived little or no material benefit from oil. Even in the north there was anger that the sizeable oil revenues were seemingly enriching a small minority of government officials and business interests, while ordinary citizens and even middle-class professionals have become impoverished and health and education services are deteriorating. There is a clear need for Sudan's oil revenues to be transparently audited so that Sudanese citizens can express their wishes as to how it is spent.

A particular worry expressed by southerners is that oil revenues are being used by the government to procure new military hardware. UN security officers the APG met in Lokichoggio agreed with this prognosis. This is hard to quantify, precisely because the oil revenues are not transparent. However, military spending by the Government of Sudan has certainly increased since oil started flowing, from US\$162 million in 1998 to US\$327 million in 2000³¹. The recent entry of Russia's state oil company Slavnet into the Sudanese oil market, was accompanied by a military-technical pact with Moscow and the delivery of an estimated 12 Russian MIG fighter planes³². Oil revenues have also increased the government of Sudan's capacity to manufacture military hardware domestically.

The APG recommends that the international community press for full transparency for Sudan's oil revenues. This should be achieved both through pushing the Sudanese government to disclose its accounts, and through requiring oil companies across the board to publish the payments they make to Governments in Sudan and other developing countries.

4.3.3 Corporate Social Responsibility

The companies with oil concessions in southern Sudan include:

- Talisman (Canada)
- OMV (Austria)
- Lundin (Sweden)
- Petronas (Malaysia)
- China National Petroleum Corporation (China)

British companies involved in Sudanese oil include:

- Weir Pumps played a key role in providing pumping stations for the pipeline
- Rolls Royce provide and maintain engines for use in pumping stations
- BP have a major stake in PetroChina, a subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corporation³³
- HSBC and Royal Bank of Scotland have headed a syndicate of investors underwriting \$569million of credit for Talisman³⁴, whilst other UK finance houses have been linked with Petronas.

The role of these multinational oil corporations in Sudan raises stark questions about corporate social responsibility. Talisman and other companies have been profiting from oil extraction, while there is strong evidence that their activities are highly damaging to local communities. Government of Sudan troops and allied militias are operating with the explicit aim of protecting the facilities of the oil companies, and in so doing have seemingly perpetrated gross human rights violations. The efforts of Talisman and others to ensure that such forces do not attack civilians in an effort to secure their concession areas from rebel attack have been woefully inadequate. Perhaps as worryingly, the airstrips built and

maintained by oil companies at Heglig have, by Talisman's own admission, been used by the government's military aircraft for offensives. The oil roads built by the companies have also been used by government troops, allowing them to extend their offensives into the rainy season.

Given these explicit links, it is clear that oil companies in Sudan must be far more proactive in ensuring that they are not complicit in human rights abuses within their respective concession areas. There must be accountability for the consequences of each company's security arrangements. Companies must not be complicit in escalating the conflict or in attacks upon civilians. There are very strong charges to be answered. Western governments have a responsibility to be more robust in ensuring that such companies do not have a detrimental effect on the human rights situation in host countries.

4.3.4 Oil and the peace process

The issue of oil revenues is likely to be central to any serious peace negotiations. The lack of development in the south of Sudan is striking. Oil revenues are vital in order to kickstart the economy of the south, and to improve the quality of life of ordinary southerners. Conversations that the APG had with southerners convinced us that the only way many of them would agree to remaining part of a unified country was if there was a marked improvement in their material and political standing. It is therefore vital that the south has access to its equitable share of oil revenues, as part of a wider political peace settlement. Transparency mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that civil society has some influence over the way revenues are spent.

The APG believes that oil companies must exercise responsibility for security operations in their concessions, even if they have suspended pumping.

Oil companies must ensure that they are in no way complicit in human rights abuses by security forces protecting the oil installations, as outlined in the US/UK Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights in the Extractive Industries, as well as co-operating fully with the investigation of current allegations.

4.4 HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

Sudan's human rights record has been consistently poor in recent decades, and has been the subject of international condemnation by the UN General Assembly and other governments and bodies. Over the last couple of years however, many governments claim to have seen an improvement in Sudan's human rights performance, prompting moves towards the ending of Sudan's previous political isolation. The UK government believes that there has been some improvement since 2000³⁵, while the EU has made some signals that it is preparing for the normalisation of relations, in terms of granting EU-ACP development aid to Sudan. This is based on progress that the EU has cited in its 'critical dialogue' with the government of Sudan, on human rights and other issues.

Nevertheless, the APG found serious deficiencies in terms of human rights and good governance during our trip. There are clearly issues of accountability, democracy and respect for human rights on both sides of the conflict. A number of issues concerned the group.

4.4.1 Abductions

The problem of abductions and slavery in Sudan is one that has received a great deal of political and media attention. Whilst in Bahr El-Ghazal - an area affected by abductions - the APG was briefed on the problem by local NGO workers. The most well-documented incidences of abduction relate to the activities of government-sponsored People's Defence Force (PDF) militias made up of Baggara tribesmen from Darfur, Western Sudan. The Baggara have undertaken slave raids in neighbouring Dinka territory for generations. However, since 1983 these raids have generally accompanied the passage of the government's military supply train down to its garrison in Wau. Baggara militias are used to protect the train from SPLA attack, and in the process undertake looting and abductions of women and children in villages surrounding the railway line.

Other areas have also been subject to such raids. Government-aligned *murahaleen* militias, also comprised largely of Baggara tribesmen, undertake raids further north, on the outskirts of Dinka territory. There

have also been a large number of abductions documented in the Nuba Mountains, historically the site of some of the worst human rights abuses of the conflict. Abductees are used as cheap or free labour by their captors. Many women are subject to rape and forced marriage. Unicef estimates that there are 6,000 active cases of abduction in Sudan.

The system of buying back 'slaves', practiced by some NGOs, is well documented. The APG met a range of people who were critical of this practice. A key criticism was that it encouraged the problem by creating a cash market, and is associated with various 'scams', many of which the SPLA are said to be involved with. These criticisms seem to be well-founded.

Whilst the Sudan government has denied that slavery exists within its borders, it set up the Committee for the Eradication of Abduction of Women and Children (CEAWC) in 1999, with the aim of tracing and returning abductees. So far around 700 have been reunified with their families. As part of the initiative of US Envoy John Danforth an international Commission of Enquiry has been set up to examine the problem of slavery. It seems clear that the practice of abduction does still occur in Sudan. There would seem to be a need for further research, documentation and monitoring into the issue. The APG hopes that the Commission of Enquiry is a significant step towards this. Inter-tribal reconciliation is an important step towards reducing raiding, and such initiatives should be supported. There is also a lack of accountability - few if any involved with abductions have ever been brought to trial.

4.4.2 Sharia law

One of the recognised bones of contention in the peace process relates to the legal system and to the imposition of Sharia law upon non-Muslim southerners. Representatives from both sides of the conflict whom the APG met had a very different outlook on the issue of Sharia, a highly politicised issue. Sharia, as currently practiced in Sudan, raises issues of religious freedom, most notably for southerners living in the north and in government-controlled areas in the south. It also

contributes to the problems of legal and extra-legal discrimination which non-Muslim southerners face in society more broadly. A number of sentences carried out under Sharia, such as flogging and amputations, contravene the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which the Sudanese government is in the process of ratifying³⁶.

4.4.3 Accountability of security forces

Whilst in Khartoum, the APG heard a good deal from civil society representatives about the activities of the security police, who seem to operate with an alarming lack of accountability. A range of opposition politicians from parties such as the DUP and PNC told us that they had been imprisoned. Sudan is still subject to a 'state of emergency' as expressed in its National Security Act, which entails that anyone can be arrested and held without charge. Many arrests and acts of harassment are clearly politically motivated, and often target human rights activists, students and journalists.

4.4.4 War related abuses

War is never good for human rights and this has certainly been the case in Sudan. The worst human rights abuses are undoubtedly committed in areas directly affected by the conflict, as mentioned elsewhere in this report. Both sides in the conflict have indiscriminately targeted civilians in the past. The bombing of civilians by the government is commonplace. In May 2002, 18 civilians were killed by bombs dropped from a Government Antonov plane³⁷. This incident caused international outrage and was a transgression of the Danforth agreement, but such bombings have long been a widespread feature of the conflict. The denial of relief aid, attacks by troops, rape, torture, burning of huts and looting are all widely reported. Whilst the APG was in Sudan, such reports were coming out of Western Upper Nile and other areas.

4.4.5 The human rights situation in SPLA held territories

Whilst the poor human rights record of the Sudanese government is well-documented, the APG also heard of some human rights concerns in SPLA controlled territories. The centralised and militaristic structure of the SPLA has inevitably posed some problems for human rights and democratisation. Since the mid 1990s however, there have been moves towards creating civil court structures in southern Sudan, as a complement to existing customary or tribal law³⁸. The APG visited the new civil courts in Rumbek, which have been recently rebuilt. The development of such a legal structure is plainly a vital step towards guaranteeing human rights in the south, though such an initiative faces large obstacles, most notably a lack of access to training for judges and lawyers. There are reportedly fewer than 100 trained lawyers in southern Sudan, an area the size of Western Europe³⁹. Child soldiers have long been used by the SPLA, though some moves are being made to demobilise these in recent years. The SPLA have also been accused of attacks on civilians, looting of civilian and humanitarian premises and property, forced recruitment and rape⁴⁰.

4.4.6 Women in Sudan

During the visit, both the government and the SPLA were keen to give the impression that women enjoyed equal rights. However, the APG came away believing that women in Sudan face huge problems, in the south as well as the north. In the north in particular, there are a good number of educated women, many of whom had jobs in the government, though none occupy the highest positions. Poor Sudanese women face great difficulties. Restrictive laws such as the Public Order Act prevent women from trading or travelling except between the hours of 5am and 5.30pm, and women can be picked up by police for not being appropriately dressed. Southern Sudanese female IDPs living in the north are subject to particular discrimination. Often single mothers, such women have no way to support their families other than through illicit activities such as brewing alcohol or prostitution, for which they are often arrested. Omdurman women's prison is reportedly full of women

convicted for such offences. Women are also subject to the harshest penalties under Sharia, with adultery punishable by death.

In southern Sudan women have an equally low status. As in the north, women can be punished under tribal law for adultery and for leaving their husbands, and are not adequately protected from domestic violence. The APG visited a prison in Rumbek, where women were imprisoned for adultery. Whilst the APG met a lot of women involved with the SPLM, SRRA and civil society in Nairobi, women evidently had little voice within Sudan itself. Access to education for women is plainly problematic, and there is an acknowledged lack of educated women in the south. On a visit to a teacher-training centre in Akon, the APG found only one female trainee amongst dozens of men.

4.4.7 Political freedom, Democratisation and civil society

The APG has serious concerns about the lack of democratic legitimacy of the Government of Sudan, and of the SPLA. No seriously contested elections have been held since the current regime came to power. The last elections were boycotted by opposition parties, who felt that they would be unfair. The Umma Party, Sudan's largest party, returned from exile in 2001, but a number of parties such as the Communist Party remain banned. The Democratic Unionist Party, Sudan's second largest

party, is still officially exiled. Hassan Turabi, the leader of the Popular National Congress party has been placed under arrest by the government. The APG met representatives from all of these parties in Khartoum. While they seem to enjoy improved freedom of expression, many told us of arbitrary arrest and harassment. None were prepared to contest elections.

Civil society organisations and human rights defenders complained to the APG about harassment by security forces and their lack of legal protection. Newspapers are subject to censorship and some journalists stated that they had been targeted by security forces. Many northerners outside the government expressed a wish that measures promoting democratisation be included in the peace process.

The SPLA/M appear to have some way to go in terms of democratisation and civil society participation. There are no mechanisms to assess the popular mandate of the SPLA/M, who run the civil administration of the south via the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association. A key problem in the fostering civil society in southern Sudan is the dearth of education, but greater pressure must also be put on the SPLA in order to encourage greater grassroots participation. The New Sudan Council of Churches is the main civil society body in the south, but the SPLA have sometimes been obstructive of this and other grassroots organisations, for example in obstructing civilian participation in the People-to-People grassroots peace process.

The APG recommends that human rights should be placed at the centre of the EU-Sudan dialogue.

Normalisation of relations with Sudan should be clearly contingent on identified improvements in human rights, such as the ratification and application of key international human rights treaties and the lifting of the 'state of emergency'. The SPLA must also be pressured into improving its human rights performance, particularly with regard to its respect for humanitarian law.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

Peace

The APG welcomes the UK government's increased commitment to promoting peace in Sudan.

We hope that the UK's special envoy, backed by the FCO's new Sudan Unit will work effectively towards a co-ordinated and coherent peace process. The UK, in partnership with the US and European governments and key regional players, must press the parties towards a negotiated political settlement.

The APG believes that any peace settlement must be just and sustainable, and must therefore address the root causes of the conflict.

The Sudanese people have the right to self-determination, and the UK and others must not preclude any options regarding the future of the country. The APG believes that the IGAD Declaration of Principles remains the best basis for the negotiation of a political settlement.

The APG recommends that UK and EU diplomatic engagement with Sudan be backed up by a firm of transparent system of incentives and disincentives.

Debt relief and EU-ACP development aid for the government of Sudan must be based upon tangible progress in the peace process and human rights. Such progress must be monitored and measured by a defined and transparent set of benchmarks.

The APG believes donors should give increased support to grassroots peace initiatives and facilitating civil society involvement in the peace process.

Local processes such as the People-to-People talks, which address inter-tribal and localised conflicts must be encouraged across the country including initiatives which cross the north-south divide. These could be funded through DFID's Conflict Resolution Pool. Programmes which increase the capacity of civil society should also be encouraged, and a role for civil society in the peace process developed.

Development and humanitarian aid

The APG recommends that the Department for International Development support education in Sudan.

Education can make a contribution to peace and to the rebuilding of Sudanese communities and civil society. Particular support is needed for carefully targeted education projects in Sudan, delivered via the UN and NGOs. Opportunities for higher education for southern Sudanese and other marginalised groups must be expanded.

The APG recommends that humanitarian donors look beyond basic relief aid towards a longer-term approach.

Projects should be supported which focus on increasing the capacity of basic health services, widening health education and sustaining food security, in order to foster self-reliance and strengthen the coping mechanisms of vulnerable communities. Projects which increase the capacity of Sudanese civil society should also be supported.

The APG recommends that the UK and others make a concerted effort to ensure that humanitarian agencies are allowed to operate effectively by both sides in the conflict.

The UK government and others must be more co-ordinated and robust in pushing for negotiated flight access to problem areas, in pressing both parties to respect international humanitarian law, and in backing this up with an effective system of monitoring.

Oil

The APG recommends that strong steps be taken immediately to stop attacks on civilians around the oilfields.

Human rights abuses around the oilfields must stop now. The UK should lend political and financial support to a team of international human rights monitors in all areas where oil-related human rights abuses are reportedly occurring.

The APG recommends that the international community press for full transparency for Sudan's oil revenues.

This should be achieved both through pushing the Sudanese government to disclose its accounts, and through requiring oil companies across the board to publish the payments they make to Governments in Sudan and other developing countries.

The APG believes that oil companies must exercise responsibility for security operations in their concessions, even if they have suspended pumping.

Oil companies must ensure that they are in no way complicit in human rights abuses by security forces protecting the oil installations, as outlined in the US/UK Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights in the Extractive Industries, as well as co-operating fully with the investigation of current allegations.

Human Rights

The APG recommends that human rights should be placed at the centre of the EU-Sudan dialogue.

Normalisation of relations with Sudan should be clearly contingent on identified improvements in human rights, such as the ratification and application of key international human rights treaties and the lifting of the 'state of emergency'. The SPLA must also be pressured into improving its human rights performance, particularly with regard to its respect for humanitarian law.

6. APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

ITINERARY 7th – 12th APRIL 2002

Sunday 7 April Khartoum

- 0830 Briefing with HM Ambassador
- 1000 Call on HE Mr Angelo Beda, Acting Speaker, National Assembly and key legislators
Call on HE Mr Sadiq al Mahdi, President, Umma Party
- 1200 Call on HG Most Revd Joseph Marona, Archbishop of Episcopal Church and other Church leaders
- 1330 Call on HE Mr Chol Deng Alok, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
- 1500 Working Lunch with INGO Country Directors
- 1730 Tea with human rights groups, hosted by Head of Political Section
- 2000 Dinner with politicians, hosted by HM Ambassador

Monday 8 April

- 0900 Meeting with Sudanese civil society activists
- 1030 Call on HE Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, First Vice President
- 1130 Call on HE Mr Ahmed al Mirghani, Deputy President, Democratic Unionist Party
- 1300 Call on HE Mr Abdel Halim al Mutaafi, Wali of Khartoum
- 1400 Lunch hosted by Wali of Khartoum
- 1630 Press Conference with local newspapers
- 1800 Tea with leading Southern politicians
- 1930 Reception hosted by HM Ambassador

Tuesday 9 April

- 0900 Arrive **al Obeid** airport
- 0915 Visit to the State Wali of North Kordofan
- 1015 Field trip to CARE water project, El Kaow village
- 1200 Fly from El Obeid to **Rumbek**
Visit to Christian Aid judiciary project
Dinner with SPLM and local authorities

Wednesday 10 April

- 0700 Depart Rumbek on Save the Children plane
- 0815 Arrive **Akon, Bahr el Ghazal** state
Briefing on abductions

Visit to Save the Children teacher training centre
1100 Depart Akon for **Malualkon**
1115 Visits to Tearfund rice growing project and International Red Cross health training
Visit to Warawar market
Overnight at Tearfund compound

Thursday 11 April 0700 Depart Malualkon for **Keew, Western Upper Nile**
0815 Meet with displaced people from oil areas
Visit to health centre
1030 Depart Keew for **Lokichoggio, Kenya**
1500 Briefing on military situation in southern Sudan
Briefing on food security from World Food Programme
1700 Depart Lokichoggio
1845 Arrive **Nairobi**
1930 Reception in Nairobi hosted by Deputy High
Commissioner

Friday 12 April 0930 Meeting with civil society organisations
1130 Meeting with SPLA leadership
1500 Press conference
1630 Meeting with NGO/UN directors
2325 Depart Nairobi

APPENDIX 2

ACRONYMS

APG	Associate Parliamentary Group
CEAWC	Commission of Enquiry on Abduction of Women and Children
DFID	Department for International Development
DOP	Declaration of Principles (which form basis of IGAD peace talks)
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
ECOS	European Coalition on Oil in Sudan
EU-ACP	European Union – African, Caribbean and Pacific. Refers to relations between EU and ex-colonial nations, including aid and trade provisions.
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
GOS	Government of Sudan
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Inter Governmental Authority on Development. Regional body overseeing main peace talks.
JLEI	Joint Libyan - Egyptian Initiative
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MSF	Medicins sans Frontieres
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NIF	National Islamic Front
NSCC	New Sudan Council of Churches
OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan. UN aid operation covering most of southern Sudan.
PDF	Popular Defence Forces. Government of Sudan militias.
PNC	Popular National Congress. Hassan Turabi's Islamist party.
SAF	Sudan Alliance Forces. Rebel group based in eastern Sudan.
SPDF	Sudan People's Defence Force. Predominantly Nuer rebel splinter group, led by Riek Machar. Periodically aligned with Government of Sudan but now merged with SPLA.
SPLA/M	Sudan People's Liberation Army / Movement
SRRA	Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association. Humanitarian/administrative body under SPLA control.

APPENDIX 3


SUDAN TIMELINE

1898	Anglo-Egyptian forces under Lord Kitchener overthrow Mahdist state.
1899	Condominium agreement signed.
1930s-40s	Nationalist political movements develop in north of country.
1947	Juba Conference. Northern and southern Sudanese leaders agree to pursue a united Sudan.
1953	'Sudanization' of south by northern government begins, causing resentment in south.
1955	First civil war started after Torit Mutiny in Equatoria, and massacre of northerners across south.
1956	Sudan gains independence. Ismail al-Azhari becomes prime minister.
1958	Military coup led by General Abboud.
1963	Anyanya rebel movement, the forerunner of the SPLA, formed in south.
1966	Sadiq al Mahdi, becomes Prime Minister after Umma Party wins elections.
1969	Colonel Jafaar Nimeiri takes power in coup.
1970	Joseph Lagu becomes leader of Anyanya
1972	Addis Ababa agreement ends the first war. Based in regional autonomy for south and ending racial and religious discrimination.
1973	Sudan's constitution amended, creating a one party state and instituting state of emergency.
1983	Nimeiri introduces sharia and dissolves regional and national assemblies. Introduction of northern troops into southern garrisons provokes mutiny in Bor. SPLA/M formed. Second war begins.
1985	Nimeiri overthrown after popular uprising. Transitional Military Council set up under General Abd al-Rahman Swar al-Dahab.
1986	Sadiq al-Mahdi becomes Prime Minister again, following elections.
1988	War related famine in southern Sudan kills 250,000.
June 1989	Military coup takes place, backed by the Hassan al-Turabi National Islamic Front. Lt-General Omar al-Bashir takes power.
Nov 1989	Para-military Popular Defence Force created. Political clampdown commences.
1990	Widespread arrests of political activists across north. Reintroduction of sharia.
1991	300,000 southern Sudanese, refugees returning from Ethiopia after fall of Mengistu regime, are bombed by Government of Sudan. Inter SPLA fighting breaks out between mainstream and Nasir factions. Fighting escalates in Nuba mountains.

- 1992** Amnesty reports 'ethnic cleansing' policies in Nuba mountains.
- 1993** Sudan added to US State Department list of states sponsoring terrorism. IGAD peace process is initiated. Over 100,000 by government offensive in Western Equatoria.
- 1994** British Ambassador expelled after row over Archbishop of Canterbury's visit to southern Sudan. Clearances of IDP settlements around Khartoum by government of Sudan. IGAD Declaration of Principles agreed upon.
- 1995** National Democratic Alliance, the opposition umbrella grouping, is formed in the Asmara Declaration. Sudan accused of involvement in assassination attempt on Egypt's President Mubarak.
- 1996** Khartoum Peace Agreement signed by government of Sudan and Nuer breakaway factions.
- 1998** US bombs Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, believing it may be manufacturing chemical weapons. New constitution agreed upon. Famine in Bahr- el Ghazal kills around 70,000.
- 1999** Oil pumping begins. Parliament is dissolved and State of Emergency declared by Bashir. Wunlit agreement signed, ending Nuer-Dinka tribal conflict in south.
- 2000** Opposition parties boycott elections in protest at perceived vote rigging.
- Feb 2001** Hassan al-Turabi arrested after split with Bashir.
- July 2001** Failure of Nairobi peace talks between government of Sudan and SPLA. Libyan-Egyptian peace initiative approved by government. New oilfields commence pumping in Unity state.
- October 2001** US President George Bush appoints John Danforth as special envoy to Sudan. Nuba mountains ceasefire and other humanitarian agreements signed by parties.
- 2002** UK appoints Alan Goulty as special envoy, after Rt Hon Clare Short MP visits Sudan. Rival southern factions the SPLA and SPDF sign merger.

APPENDIX 4

Map of Sudan



Map No. 3707 Rev. 5 UNITED NATIONS
September 2000

Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

APPENDIX 5

IGAD Declaration of Principles

We, Representatives of the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (hereinafter referred to as the GOS) the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army and the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army – United (hereinafter referred to as the SPLM/A and SPLM/SPLA-United respectively):

Recalling the previous peace talks between the Government of the Sudan on the one hand, the SPLM/SPLA and SPLM/SPLA-United on the other, namely Addis Ababa in August 1989, Nairobi in December 1989, Abuja in May/July 1992, Abuja in April/May 1993, Nairobi in May 1993, and Frankfurt in January 1992;

Cognisant of the importance of the unique opportunity afforded by the IGADD Peace Initiative to reach a negotiated peaceful solution to the conflict in the Sudan;

Concerned by the continued human suffering and misery in the war affected areas:

Hereby agree in the following Declaration of Principles (DOP) that would constitute the basis for resolving the conflict in the Sudan:

I Any comprehensive resolution of the Sudan conflict requires that all parties to the conflict fully accept and commit themselves to that position that

1.1 The history and nature of the Sudan conflict demonstrate that a military solution can not bring lasting peace and stability the country

1.2 A peaceful and just political solution must be the common objective of the parties to the conflict

2 The right of self-determination of the people of south Sudan to determine their future status through a referendum must be affirmed.

3 Maintaining unity of the Sudan must be given priority by all parties provided that the following principles are established in the political, legal, economic and social framework of the country.

3.1 Sudan is a multi-racial, multi –ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural society. Full recognition and accommodation of these diversities must be affirmed.

3.2 Complete political and social equalities of all peoples in the Sudan must be guaranteed by law.

3.3 Extensive rights of self-determination on the basis of federation, autonomy, etc, to the various peoples of the Sudan must be affirmed.

3.4 A secular and democratic state must be established in the Sudan. Freedom of belief and worship and religious practice shall be guaranteed in full to all Sudanese citizens. State and religion shall be separated. The basis of personal and family laws can be religion and customs.

3.5 Appropriate and fair sharing of wealth among the various people of the Sudan must be realised.

3.6 Human rights as internationally recognised shall form part of this arrangement and shall be embodied in constitution.

3.7 The Independence of the Judiciary shall be enshrined in the constitution and laws of the Sudan.

4 In the absence of agreement on the above principles referred to in 3.1 to 3.7, the respective people will have the option to determining their future including independence through a referendum.

5 An interim arrangement shall be agreed upon, the duration and the tasks of which should be negotiated by the parties.

6 The parties shall negotiate a cease-fire agreement to enter into force as part of the overall settlement of the conflict in the Sudan.

Nairobi, 20th July, 1994

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